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readings. 1, like O'Connor (as I understand him), think R is extremely plausible on both readings. However, there are those who find R plausible on
the first reading but not on the second. I don't have the space here to defend
the plausibility of R on the second reading. Let me just say that to reject R
on that second reading, it seems one would need a reason to think there is
no good that (a) includes the permission of all inscrutable evil but doesn't
include divine intervention of the kind that would make it possible for us to
discern reasons for the permission of such evils and (b) is greater than any
other obtainable good that doesn't include such things or other things as
bad. But we don't have a reason to think there is no good like this. Our
inability to identify such a good certainly doesn't provide us with such a
reason.
10. My thanks to Dan Howard-Snyder, Bill Rowe and Linda Zagzebski
for their comments on earlier drafts.

Religion and Faction in Hume's Moral Philosophy by Jennifer A. Herdt.
Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xiv and 300. Cloth $59.95
ELIZABETH RADCLIFFE, Santa Clara University
Jennifer Herdt's fascinating book is a study of the concept of sympathy
in Hume's moral philosophy. So why this title? What makes Herdt's
discussion unique is that she examines this central notion in Hume's
moral theory in the context of religion and its divisive effect on seventeenth- and eighteenth-century society. Her thesis is that when Hume's
moral theory is studied within the tradition of natural law from which it
is descended, it becomes evident that Hume replaces divine revelation
in previous moral frameworks with the workings of natural sympathy.
Generally, the argumentation of this book is historical; that is, Herdt
defends various claims concerning the philosophical development of
Hume's moral philosophy by appealing to the ideas and current events
to which he is reacting. Herdt's interpretation appeals to a breadth of
Hume's writings, including the critical essays and The History of England.
Consequently, readers should not come here looking for an analytic
study of the arguments in Hume's ethics; rather, they should expect an
interpretation in a broad, historically-informed setting. At the same
time, Herdt's discussion leads to some interesting claims about the content of Hume's moral theory that I wil1later address here.
The purpose of Herdt's plan is clear: She wants to reject the approach
to Hume that has mainly seen him as concerned with epistemology, and
substitute for it an interpretation that sees Hume as concerned in his
work with achieving a social outcome-namely, peace and prosperity.
Then, she claims, Hume's political essays and the History form a unified
corpus with his other very famous works (Preface, xiii). Herdt explains
that her book, to which it is well worth devoting some time, is designed
to defend eight claims.
(1) Hume's project is best understood in the context of natural law,
but it is more radical than the other natural law theorists. They purport
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to give accounts of morality by appeal only to human nature, but steal in
reference to Providence; Hume, on the other hand, makes no such surreptitious references. (2) A major goal in the Treatise of Human Nature is
to replace the role of Providence in morality with a naturalistic concept
that connects morality to human flourishing without being egoistic. (3)
That concept is sympathy, and so to understand the secularization of
moral theory, we must understand sympathy. (4) Hume recognizes that
natural, unregulated, sympathy can reinforce prejudices and divisions,
and so he argues that moral judgment requires a correction of sympathetic feelings; this leads to a normative, and not merely a descriptive,
account of moral judgment. (5) This nonnative account, developed
through the essays and the History, requires that we have the capacity to
enter into the perspectives of others and this allows us to overcome factions. (6) A theme of these works is that religious fanaticism and sectarianism undermine the role of sympathy in making moral judgments. (7)
Hume holds that the lives of those who lead so-called "artificial" lives,
the lives of religious zeal, cannot be entered into sympathetically. (8)
Hume's own capacity for sympathetic understanding is adequate only if
he is right that theism is logically untenable, although he is still correct
to hold that good judgment requires a sympathetic understanding of
actions in history.
It is difficult to disagree with most of the main claims in Herdt's project here, and she substantiates her readings with previously neglected
material concerning the development of the concept of sympathy, a
"near-obsession" for eighteenth-century moralists who wanted to elude
the charge of egoism. She traces the notion of sympathy in the
Latitudinarians, who reacted to the Calvinist doctrine of the viciousness
of human nature with the claim that sympathy and pity demonstrated
the benevolence of human passions. Shaftesbury incorporated the view
of the Latitudinarians into his theory of the sympathetic sharing of pleasures, but Shaftesbury added a pessimistic note about the abuses of sympathy when limited to one's own sect. The enemies of the sympathybased moralists were first, Hobbes, who depicted people as only selfinterested, and later, Mandeville, who charged that those who thought
sympathy instinctual could not argue that it was meritorious at the same
time. So, Butler then argued that human beings engage in a reflective
process in which they place themselves imaginatively in the situation of
others. All of these formulations set the stage for Hume, Herdt argues, to
introduce his new account of sympathy-new, she says, because Hume is
the first to suggest that sympathy is the source of moral judgments, and
not only of motivations or information about the state of others (32-38).
I want to examine critically a few of the moves in Herdt's interpretation. She initiates her discussion by remarking, "Hume's account of
sympathy is often dismissed as an unfortunate example of associationist
psychology, which Bume introduces in the Treatise but thankfully has
the sense to take out of the restatement of his moral theory in the
Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals" (1). She later supports this
assessment by appealing to Philip Mercer and Pall Ardal (42)', who complain that Hume's account of sympathy depicts it as mechanical and
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instinctual. She is certainly right to object to their perspectives, but their
views should not be taken to represent the state of Hume scholarship on
the matter. Hume's account of sympathy from the Treatise is taken quite
seriously by current scholars in Humean ethics and by contemporary
virtue theorists as well, and much recent analysis has centered on sympathy and its role in making us both moral judges and the subject of
mora] judgments.'
One interesting issue which emerges in Herdt's discussion is whether
Hume has an account of normativity in his moral theory, or whether he
means it as a purely descriptive account of how we derive mora I judgments. Herdt maintains of Hume's account of natural sympathy and its
correction: "To the extent to which this is seen as an attempt to give an
account of the origin of our moral distinctions, of the way in which
moral distinctions first developed out of pre-moral distinctions, rather
than an account of how the capacity for good moral judgment can be
formed, it is misguided" (78). She thinks that Hume includes normativity in his account, but that he can only get it by begging the question.
Her argument is that an attempt to found the normative on the natural
can never get back to the "purely" natural, for any account of how
morality arises out of some aspect of human nature already assumes
that feature is morally important and others are not. So, Hume can justifiably describe how we make moral judgments, but he cannot give an
account of the genesis of morality itself.3 Still, he presents a normative
(not merely descriptive) account, but one that simply cannot explain the
source of value itself.
But I think Herdt's remarks presuppose a framework foreign to
Hume's project. The account of how we make moral judgments is
Hume's account of how our moral distinctions arise. The label "moral"
here means what we take to be moral; it is not a designation of a special
quality bestowed on our concepts by something beyond our own experience. To charge that Hume can never get beyond the normative to the
natural supposes a demarcation of the moral versus the natural that was
not a part of Hume's perspective, not a feature of his naturalistic theory
of morality. That we don't take our natural moral sentiments to be
indicative of morality, but instead filter them through a correction
process, doesn't imply that we have stolen the normative into the correction process we have chosen. Rather, the correction process is necessitated by a practical need; and since we regard the results as indicators of
morality, on Hume's account, that is how moral distinctions arise for us.
Herdt's examination of Hume's theory progresses through a discussion of the controversy over the pleasures of tragedy. What sort of people take pleasure in seeing the sufferings of others, certain eighteenthcentury Calvinist critics ask, and ought we to allow cultivation of such
habits through the theater? Hume's stand on this issue was evident
both through his critical essays and his support of the production of a
controversial tragedy in Edinburgh, a play named Douglas, on a Scottish
folk hero, written by a relative and friend, John Home. Hume's philosophical answer to the problem of tragedy, Herdt argues, was to point to
the role of belief, but not to a simple distinction between our reaction to
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fiction and genuine belief. That is a distinction which he sometimes has
trouble making on his phenomenal characterization of belief in terms of
force and vivacity. Rather, he analyzes belief in terms of connections of
ideas that form a coherent network (108-10). Exactly how Herdt's solution is related to what Hume goes on to say about sympathy in his essay
"Of Tragedy" isn't entirely clear, but with some work, one can get the
point. In that essay, Herdt claims, Hume's view is that the presence of
an aesthetic framework makes us feel uninvolved as spectators to
tragedy, just as when we have limited sympathy with others, we are
unaffected by their situations; in neither case is there a "moral claim"
made on us, no call to action. Further, Hume charges that religious factions have the same effect as literature or poetry-namely, they induce
an "artificial connection among the ideas". So, Herdt is promoting the
idea that Hume's solution to the problem of taking pleasure in tragedy is
to replace these artificial systems that produce a distorted sense of reality with natural belief systems that require broad perspectives (111-16).
Herdt's analysis proceeds then to show that Hume turns his advocacy
of wide sympathetic understanding of foreign viewpoints into an attack
on Scottish Evangelicals, arguing that the artificiality of their moral system makes it inaccessible to our general understanding. She maintains
that the sort of sympathy doing the work in Hume's theory is a reflective understanding, informed by refined and expert judgment, as indicated in Hume's essay "Of the Standard of Taste". In other words, we
are not actually capable of taking on the feelings of others, so Hume's
theory is not one of moral sentiment, but one of sympathetic understanding (121, 125, 166-67).
The obvious question to ask about Herdt's spin on Hume's account of
sympathy is: What happens to the motivational aspect of his account? I
don't have the space here to argue for an interpretation of Hume that
shows how our sympathetic responses, which when taken from "a general point of view" ground our moral judgments and are motivating, but
I have argued at length for this thesis elsewhere. 4 This interpretation is,
I maintain, the import of Hume's various famous claims about the motivating force of "morality". If we couple the thesis that our sympathetic
responses are motives with Hume's claims about how reason alone does
not motivate us, then it is puzzling how Hume can mean the product of
sympathy to be only sympathetic understanding. For I think there is very
good reason to consider reason and understanding as purely intellectual
and not motivational "faculties" (functions, not faculties reified), productive of beliefs, but not on their own productive of motives. 5
Herdt's final chapter and conclusion argue that, due to "an ironic failure on Hume's part to extend sympathetic understanding to religious
believers," he makes an unjust accusation in charging that religious systems propagate narrow perspectives and prejudices. "Hume can make
sense of the possibility of entering sympathetically into the situation of
someone without embracing his or her beliefs or way of life, but this
possibility does not extend to theism since theism is not simply wrong
but' absurd' and' artificial''' (Herdt, 223). I think that to embrace
Herdt's perspective is to see Hume's conclusions in the Dialogues
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Concerning Natural Religioll as insincere in a certain respect; indeed if he
was convinced first of the logical incoherence (and not just the falsity) of
theism, why should he not then view the way of life that springs from it
as absurd? I am not here to defend him in his conclusions, but to wonder whether Herdt is correct in her accusation, which implies that Hume
argued from the charge of absurdity. Perhaps Hume's disdain for religious factionalism in eighteenth-century England motivated his discussions; did it also motivate the conclusions of particular arguments? It is
up to Hume's readers to ask whether his arguments concerning religious
belief are sound.
NOTES
1. Pall, Ardal, Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise (Edinburgh
University Press), 1966, and Mercer, Sympathy and Ethics: A Study of the
Relation between with Special Reference to Hume's "Treatise"(Oxford Clarendon
Press), 1972 .
2. See, for example, Annette Baier, A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on
Hume's Treatise (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 1991; Charlotte
Brown, "From Spectator to Agent: Hume's Theory of Obligation," HU1I1e
Studies XX (April 1994): 19-36; Rachel Cohon, "Is Hume a Noncognitivist in
the Motivation Argument?" Philosophical Studies 85 (March 1997): 251-66 ;
Don Garrett, Cognition and Commitment in HUl1lc's Mornl Philosophy (Oxford
University Press, 1997): Chapter 9; Elizabeth Radcliffe, "Hume on
Motivating Sentiments, the General Point of View, and the Inculcation of
Morality," Hume Studies XX (April 1994): 37-58.
3. She also cites Annette Baier as an ally in this.
4. See Elizabeth Radcliffe, "Hume on Motivating Sentiments," and
"How Does the Humean Sense of Duty Motivate?" Journal of the History of
Philosophy 34 (July 1996): 47-70.
5. Hume's claim that reason alone does not produce motives has mostly
been understood as the view that beliefs do not motivate, although a few critics have recently questioned this interpretation. Herdt might want to take
the view that Hume's thesis about the inertness of reason leaves it open that
the products of understanding can motivate, but I think the orthodox interpretation, which rules this out, stands on solid ground. She says herself that
the intentional, rational activities of the judge, rather than the sense of taste,
do the work in Hume's account (125); so it's difficult to see how she can
argue that reason and sympathetic understanding are two different things.

God Without the Supernatural: A Defense of Scientific Theism by Peter
Forrest (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). ISBN 0-8014-3255-3. Pp,
xiv, 256.
SIMON J, EVNINE, California Polytechnic State University
Near the beginning of his book, Peter Forrest tells us of "the sensitive
New Age cat who never eats meat and never hunts birds and lizards.
Does it, I ask, ever get the chance? Likewise," he goes on to add, "it is no
wonder that intellectual conversion to religion is rare-no one ever

